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11 tre~tment of Spanish Civil War news. 
II 
1: 
II 
lieve that this situation did exist. The insurgents had the 
support of the Vatican, and the Massachusetts population con-
tains a great percentage of Roman Catholics. They are centered 
for the most part in the large industrial areas, and it is the 
papers in these areas whose readers are predominantly Catholic 
that I shall compare with papers in sections of the state 
1 where the Catholic population is relatively small. The arbiter. 
will be history in the nature of a twenty-volume bibliography. 
The reader will forgive me, I hope, if at times I deviate 
sl1ghtly . from the stated purpose of the study to examine the 
war in an historical sense. No journalist worthy or his pro-
fession could resist the opportunity. It is a chapter of 
-= =-==---)' =-=-
history that still needs much documentation, much debunking, I 
much analysis, much interpretation. The many factors involved \: 
are of' such burning interest that they cry out f'or discussion. 
1
· 
I will, however, attempt to curb my wandering too f'ar afield, 
and will try to correlate historical insights wherever possi-
ble with the stated subject matter of' the study. 
The thesis will, I believe, serve a dual purpose. It 
will be a case history of' bias in a profession where objectiv- 11 
ity is a supposed touchstone. This in itself is a worthy 
enough undertaking, but more than just this, it will delve 
into the causes of the war, examine its gory conduct, and 
scrutinize the nature of the present government of' Spain, a 
government whose ambassador to this country once gave a banquet 
II 
to Axis diplomats at Vichy to celebrate the triumphal 
of the Japanese forces into Manila. 1 In these times, 
do all Americans well to know more about Franco Spain. 
entry ·1 
it will II 
strange 
voices in this country now cry out for us to give her aid, 
that she is a bulwark against Communism, that she is a democ-
racy. It is my firm belief' that not enough people know the 
real truth about Spain. Perhaps in some small way this study 
will help reveal that truth. 
1. Charles Foltz, Jr., The Masquerade in Spain, p. 224. 
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND TO BLOODSHED - THE HISTORICAL SETTING 
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1 
Gerald Brennan, one of the more incisive authors who has !I 
attempted to analyze the Spanish situation in the first half 11 
II 
of the twentieth century, has entitled his volume The Spanish 
Labyrinth. This appellation fits remarkably. The historical 
:I 
II 
background of the country and the varied events of the last 
half-century in Spain are of such a complexity that they can 
I 
only be correctly termed labyrinthine. 
The hLstory ot Spain is thirty thousand years old, as 
old as the cavemen who lett their strange markings under the 
rocky hills ot Astur~as and Extremaduras. Its recorded his-
tory begins with the Iberians and the Celts who first inhab-
ited the peninsula. Spain was a trading post for Carthage, 
Attica, and Phoenicia, and these early seafarers left the 
heritage· of their civilizations in the port towns of the coun- ! 
try. Rome, too, with its soldiers, brought language, law, and 
finally Christianity to the peninsula. 
The fall of Roma saw the invasions of the Vandals and 
Visigoths who ruled Spain for three hundred years until, fat 
and lazy, they fell easy prey to the proselyting soldiers of 
Islam who, led by the chieftain Tarik, swept up over the rock 
that bears his name (Djebel Lroc!J Tarik), i.e., Gibraltar, 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
and drove the Goths into a little hilly corner of Northern 
Spain that is today the provinee of Asturias. ~~ 
For five centuries the Moors ruled Spain with a reign of I 
,I 
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pled with the dark age of feudalism, Moslem Spain was a center 
of learning in which a Christian peasantry, left to agricul-
ture,prospered and flourished. 
In the North, the small Visigothic kingdoms, however, 
kept slowly expanding, sometimes fighting the Moors, more often 
at the throats of each other. In the thirteenth century, the 
Crusades drove Islam from all of Spain save southern Granada, 
but for two centuries more, biakerings amongst the many Chris- I 
,I 
tian kings of Spain left the Moors with a firm foothold on the 11 
peninsula. Obviously the man who could expel the Moors from !I 
II 
Granada was the man who could unite and control Spain. 
Ferdinand, the "fox of Aragon, 11 was such a man. With a 
propitious marriage to Isabella of Castile and Leon, he fol-
lowed the advice of a then obscure Florentine princely adviser 1 
named Machiavelli ~nd drew the Spanish people into a common 
enterprise greater than their o~~ quarrels. 1 The advice was 
cleverly given and received and the Catholic Monarchs swept 
the Moors from spain. 
Enlightenment and tolerance vanished with the Moors, and 
the Catholic Monarchs seized a new scapegoat to keep Spain 
united. On the scene appeared Torquemada and the inquisition, 1 
and hundreds of thousands of Jews were forced to leave Spain, 
while others perished horribly on the racks or at the stakes 
in the grim and bloody auto-defes that even today rival 
1 1. Foltz, .2ll· cit., p. 11. 
- = - = -- -=---=--="" 
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Buchenwald and Dachau for gory anti-Semitic excess. 
~I ---====- :=..__-==::::::..._ By the 
time these medieval pogroms slackened off, America was just 
offering itself as a great field for conquest, adventure, 
and wealth. It was this golden harvest that for one hundred 
years kept the Gatholic Monarchs and their heirs in sway over 
a Spain united in an effort to conquer the world. 
In this century of ambition and conquest, the Spanish 
oligarchy came into being, an association of noblemen, clerics ,\ 
soldiers, and merchants. Under Ferdinand and Isabella the 
Holy Brotherhood united Castile under a strong central govern-
ment. Those who resisted were eliminated. Those who bowed to 
the will of the monarchy prospered as servants of the Crown. 
The monarchy also bent the clergy to their will, and the re-
sultant oligarchy of nobleman, cleric, merchant, and soldier 
realized that together they could grow and prosper. 
The daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella married a Hapsburg ! 
and the fruit of this union, Charles I, became Charles V of 
the Holy Roman Empire. His son, Phillip II, was next in line 
for the crown, which had been divided from the Holy Roman 
Empire with the death of Charles. Under Phillip, the rule 
1 came back to Spain and wi·th it the inquisition and a new brand 
of despotic central control. 
Here the Spanish Church, under Phillip, was to all prac-
tical purposes nationalized. The clergy, spurred on by the 
crown, was at ends with the Papacy almost continually. The 
Spaniards had always felt superior to the Italiana,and were 
6 
7 
disgusted with the then prevalent corruption in Rom~. - Span~sh ~- ~~~­
clerics wanted the right to marry, and the right to the tem-
poral powers claimed by the Pope. Only the reaction to the 
reformation and resulting schism kept the Spanish Church in 
the Romish fold. Its position, howeyer, was almost as an equa~j 
rather than a subordinate. Toledo became the Holy of Holies 
for Spaniards rather than Rome. The Crown held the right to 
name the chief primate of .Spain as well as lesser bishops and 
1 archbishops. That right remained in Spain even up to when 
Alfonso XIII left the throne to make way for the Republic in 
1931 . Francisco Franco Bahamonde, El Caudillo, although not 
11 of noble blood, as ruler of Spain insisted on the same power, 
and finally·compromised with the Pope on this question. 
The end ·of this golden century saw Phillip's dream and 
Spain's future shattered in the English channel with the 
:I 
Armada. With the death of Phillip, Spain sunk into a slump . 'j 
which brought her to her nadir and which lasted for three cen- \~ 
turies. Now she had no voice in European affairs. The con- 1
1 quistador spirit had vanished. The oligarchy considered it-
self too good to work. The remaining peasantry was too under- \ 
nourished and too ignorant to do any appreciable amount of 
toil. Banditry thrived, and was equalled in infamy only by 
the corrupt agents of the government. Pestilence out the 
population in half. Fields lay fallow, choked by weeds. The 
younger members of the nobility amused themselves in bouts of 
wild debauchery, while the older members amused themselves by 
I 
I 
wrenching money out of the then starving poor. The clergy, 
too, lived ott the peasants, and religion in Spain had become 
little more than a grim superstition that held the poor in 
complete thralldom. 
Only three incidents broke the apathy of this modern dark 
age. In the eighteenth century, Charles III banished the 
Jesuits, divided the great estates, and temporarily quelle,d 
the power ot the inquisition. After his death, however, the 
oligarchy rose again, summoned the Jesuits, took back their 
estates, and let Spain slip back into its medieval morass. 
In the nineteenth century the people united with the 
oligarchy and Wellington to drive Joseph Bonaparte from Spain. 
After this, though, the Carlist War was fought between the 
clergy and the army to see whose champion would rule Spain. 
The twentieth ~:oentury saw the oligarchy lose the tail end 
of their empire to the United States, back the losing side 
in World War One, and lose a war in Morocco to the wild Ber-
bers of the Riff. 
II 
Spaniards had had enough. There was no Machiavellian 
device for the oligarchy to pursue. The people could not be 
united by a common enterprise greater than their own domestic 1 
problems. In 1925 a survey showed that in one-third of Spain 1 
some 850,000 peasants were living on less than one peseta 
(40 cents) a day. 2 Poverty was widespread. · An American to 
Andalusia in 1930 found whole villages subsisting on boiled 
2. Duchess of Atholl, Searchlight on Spain, p. 18. 
6 
3 grasses and roots. Thousands lived in caves and pits, tuber-
culosis was rife and hospitals few. 4 Much of the misery was 
caused by an illegal but widespread system of money-lending 
which made the borrower pay interest on all the principal, 
even if part had been already paid. There was no freedom of 
speech or press, no free elections; the Cortes was a tool of 
the oligarchy, and education a mockery. 
The revolution was flourishing in Russia, and the people 
were rising in Spain as well. Churches burned fiercely. 
Anarchists led mobs of peasants screaming to the manor houses 
of the nobility. Workers in the cities left their factories 
in droves. The oligarchy was frightened tremendously by this 
surge of violence on the part of the people, and in 1923 Al-
fonso XIII called a military dictator, General Miguel Primo 
de Rivera, to bolster the throne. 
11 
He succeeded at first, bringing to an end the war with I 
Abd-el- Kim the Riff, and attempting to impose self-government. \ 
By 1930, however, discontent was again rite, and Primo de I 
Rivera resigned. By April, 1931, Spain was seething with Re-
publican enthusiasm. Local revolts were bursting out all over jl 
the country. In Madrid six members of a Republican revolu-
tionary committee composed of intellectual liberals, Social-
ists, and conservatives, headed by Alcala Zamora, signed a 
3. Ibid. I p. 19 . 
4. ~., p. 20. 
-----
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The primary factor was their disbelief that the Republic I 
would last long enough to be a severe threat to their economic 
=====i!c-=-- ~~.=== 
I 
II 
II 
I 
II 
I 
I 
. ' 
control · of Spain. Their political machine in the rural dis-
tricts was still very much intaot. Finally, they believed 
that the oligarchy, faced with a definite threat to its ex-
istence, would become more united than ever. Their ace-in-the-
hole was always available, too. If faced with a loss of eco-
nomic power through governmental action, there was still the 
staunch right arm of the oligarchy, an arm controlled by its 
very sons -- the Army. 
11 
II 
The political character of the opposing forces within 
the Republic, and the constant activity and state of flux 
within the forces themselves are of such a complexity that the 
author feels compelled to present his analysis of the Republic 
and the events leading up to the Civil War in ·a semi-schematic ,
1 
manner. 
The June elections resulted in a veritable landslide for 
the republican type of government. 365 delegates to the 
Cortes were Republicans, 50 were anti-Republicans. Of these 
only one was openly a Monarchist. The Republicans were di-
' vided into Left-wing (150), Right-wing (100), and Socialist 
(115). Not a single Communist had been elected.1 
The Cortes immediately proceeded to come up with a model 
constitution comparing favorably with those of the most en-
lightened states of the world. Power was invested in a single d 
I 
body elected by the people. Women were given the right to 1! 
2 ,, 
11 vote. A 11 courageous and able attempt at land settlement 11 was 
made. It encouraged cultivation and made possible the expro-
priation of estates above a certain limit in provinces where 
need was acute. The owners were to be fully reimbursed. 
One item of the constitution received much opposition. 
1. Foltz, QQ. cit., p. 21. 
2. E. Allison Peers, The Spanish Tragedy, p. 100. 
12 
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' This was the anti-clerical section 26. The left-wing section 
I of the Cortes pushed it through. It was easy to understand 
why. The Church had labeled the Republicans Communists before I 
the 1931 elections. They were not, but they naturally became 
anti-clerical. This anti-clerical stand scuttled the young 
Republic almost before she went down the ways. Except for the 
banning of the Jesuits and the confiscation of their property, 
a popular measure for the Jesuit~ were heartily disliked by 
all Spaniards, the edicts such as banning church marriage, 
convent schools, and church burial, etc., were unjust and un-
wise. Spanish Catholics had been asked overnight to effect 
I 
' 
a transfer from the traditional reaction of Spanish Catholicis~ 
to anti-clerical secularism. Many of the people found satis- l1 
faction in the new program. Many others, though, were con-
fused and trightened by the changes and looked to more tra-
ditional government for safety. 
Although the government gained prestige by quelling a 
one-day revolt of General Sanjurjo and part of the army in 
October, 1932, the anti-clerical position of the left wing, 
the slow progress of agrarian reform, and the movement of the 
sociologists to the extreme left, resulted in a left-wing de-
feat in the 1933 elections. The right wing now had 207 
deputies. 
The group that took over in 1933, ostensibly right-wing 
Republicans, were in actuality devoted to a return to rule 
I 
13 
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I 
II 
by oligarchy. They were headed by a man backed by the Jesuits,11 
Jose Maria Gil Robles. The left-wing group that had been in 
control since 1931 had made remarkable strides. 10,000 new 
schools had been established,3 two hospitals flourished, and 
travelling libraries brought culture to a peasantry for the 
first time getting enough leisure to enjoy it. (500 village 
4 libraries were set up in 1932 alone). Gil Robles was an 
oligarchical Fascist masquerading as a Republican, and he 
and his followers set out to gain control. El presidente 
Alcala Zamora did not trust Gil Robles, but deep! te this, ·he 
and his men soon began to shelve or destroy the reforms ini-
tiated by the left-wing Republicans. Peasants were evicted 
from large estates where they had been settled. State funds 
for education, libraries, and the arts were cut. Clerical 
schools were reinstated. Amnesty was granted Sanjurjo and 
1932 revolutionists. 
Meanwhile unrest became rampant in the left-wing camp 
as the gains of the Republic were gradually being erased by 
Gil Robles. In October, 1934, a general strike was called 
over almost all of Spain as a protest against what was felt 
to be and later proved to be the forces of Fascism. The 
risings in Barcelona and Madrid were suppressed quickly, but 
in Asturias in the North, the left-wing miners united all par-
3. Peers, QQ. cit., p. 127. 
4. Atholl, ~· cit., p. 29. 
II 
II 
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ties of the left in a "Popular Front," and proceeded to seize 
a munitions plant. From there they resisted all efforts by 
government troops in the area to shake them loose. 
Gil Robles had seen the Asturias incident coming, and 
when it broke, Francisco Franco; a trusted oligarchy man, was 
at his side and took over the War Ministry. Within two days, 
"a suspiciously short time for a ship to load troops and trave~ 
from Spanish Morocco to the Bay of Biscay,"0 a load of savage 
Moors was landed in Asturias. After ten days of bitter fight-
ing, the Asturians agreed to lay down their arms if the Moors 
would be kept out of the villages. The promise was given by 
the army, but broken immediately attar the surrender. The 
brutal Moore were loosed on the helpless people. Death sen-
tences were pronounced promiscuously by the army, and prisons 
1 
began to overflow with 35,000 political prisoners. Among thos~ 
arrested all over the country were Azana, the first president, 
and Largo Caballero, the Socialist leader. They were both 
acquitt ed after months of imprisonment. 
During the time from the uprising of 1934 to the election II 
of 1936, Gil Robles and his pseudo-Republicans reigned supreme. 
Unemployment grew, wages fell 50%, and, one after another, the II 
enactments of the left wing in Spain were reversed or set 
aside. 6 But in 1935 and 1936, the people of Spain demanded 
elections. The right lined up with the oligarchy, Gil Robles' 
5. Foltz, ~· cit., p. 33. 
6. Peers, QR. cit., p. 150. 
15 
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right-wing "Republicans, 11 the rural machine of the land-owners ,
1
1 
and a new and growing party of wild-eyed Spanish Fascists made J 
II 
up of discontented students, young noblemen, bolting anarchists, 
I 
and syndicalists, known as the Falange. 
The left, realizing it had to unite or perish, came up 
with the Popular Front; a movement which integrated all the 
left-wing parties, the Republican Left, the Right-wing Repub-
licans of the "Republican Union," the Socialist Party,the 
U.G.T. (Union General de Trabajadores), the Spanish Communist 
Party, the Marxist Workers Party, the National Leftists, and 
7 two anarchist groups known as the C.N.T. and the F.A.I. 
Gil Robles and the oligarchy failed. The Spanish people 
saw through the disguise and gave the left 258 deputies to 
the . right 1 s 152. It was not a smashi ng v:iCtory for the left, 
but it put them back in control. However, the necessity to 
unite caused the left-wing control to slip more toward the 
extreme left than it had in the past. The Communists who had 
but one deputy in 1933 now had sixteen. 
The die was cast. Right and left were plainly marked. 
The people were divided, confused, and the Left was the legal 
government of Spain. The Right had exhausted all legal means 
at its disposal. It now stood too much to lose under a lib-
eral government. The oligarchy surveyed the field, and in 
7. Atholl, pp. 41, 42. 
17 
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the manner of such reactionary organisms, decided it had but 
one recourse to recapture 11 the good old days. 11 Its strong 
right arm flexed, and in July of 1936, the oligarchy, in the 
person of the Army, rose in bloody rebellion against the con-
stituted authority of the Spanish Republic. 
cera and controlled the straits of Gibraltar, keeping Franco 
bottled up in Morocco with his well-equipped force of pro-
fessional troops. The situation looked black for the insur-
gents. General Emilio Mola and his Carlists in the North 
I 
I 
!I 
I 
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All the Army needed was an incident, and in 1936 inci-
dents were the rule in Spain. In a Monarchist funeral demon-
stration against the government, a Socialist Assault Guard 
was shot. That night Assault Guards dragged Calvo Sotelo, a 
Monarchist minority group leader, - rrom his bed and riddled 
him with bullets. Sotelo had led the attack on the extreme 
Left in the Cortes, and when his body was found on July 13, 
the signal was given. By the 18th, Morocco, controlled by 
the Army, was in open revolt. In major cities all over the 
country, Army officers attempted to join the uprising against 
the Republic that they had taken an oath to defend. 
A few days later the generals took stock and were dis-
mayed at the results of their planning. In Spain they could 
muster less than 50,000 troops. They held only three iso-
lated cities and a small bridgehead at Beville and Cadiz. 
Galicia had tenuous links with Navarre and old Castile. Bara-
gossa was preparing to meet a Republican attack from Barcelona, 1 
where the revolt had failed as it did in Valencia, Bilbao, 
and Madrid. All over Spain, the Republicans were arming. 
The Navy had entered into counter-rebellion against its offi-
cers and controlled the straits of Gibraltar, keeping Franco 
Ja bottled up in Morocco with his well-equipped force of pro-
fessional troops. The situation looked black for the insur-
gents. General Emilio Mola and his Carlists in the North 
==-----
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I 
had but 26,000 cartridges, and were preparing to surrender 
when the word came from Franco in Tetuan, "We are masters of 
the strait. All is well. 111 This message had been brought 
about by the delivery to Franco of 30 :Junker transport planes 
complete with Luftwaffe crews by his _comrade in Fascism and 
reaction, Adolf Hitler. That night Franco's trained troops 
began to disembark on the runway of the airport at Seville, 
and the day was saved. "The rebels never had a chance to win 
. 2 
in Spain, 11 reports John Whitaker. This is undoubtedly true. 
It took the combined forces of world reaction to put Franco's 
1 yoke on the country. But reaction breeds reaction, and on 
Spain Franco was soon to unleash a · blood-bath of savagery un- ~1 
equalled in · world his tory. That time of gore and destruct ion, 11 
II 
ot beasts and heroes, of sheer brutality and barbarous atrocit~ 
is yet another story. I 
I 
I 
1. Foltz, p. 46. 
2. John Whitaker, We Cannot Escape History, p. 105. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE WAR - LOST BY FRANCO, WON BY THE FASCISTS 
20 
1 
The course of the rebellion had been carefully planned 
months before the murder of Calvo Sotelo precipitated it into 
a grim reality. On July 18 the garrisons in most of Spain 
I 
I 
I 
rose against the Republic whose oath of allegiance they had 
taken. In some towns the revolts were successful -- Salamanca )' 
Seville, Toledo -- but in the more important cities -- Madrid, 
Valencia, Malaga, Barcelona, Bilbao -- they were highly abor-
tive. They either were crushed by the enraged populaces, or 
misfired completely. The coup d'etat as such had fizzled. Its 
aim had been an overnight shift in the balance of power. It 
had failed. The unknown quantity had been the will of the 
people to resist. 
Had it not been for Franco's arrangement with the Luft-
waffe the Spanish Civil War would have been a four-day dis-
turbance. Unable to erose a strait patrolled by a loyal Navy, 
he called on the Germans, and 30 giant Kondor flying boats 
began shuttling Moors and Legionaires · across to Seville. What 
was doomed to failure had now succeeded by virtue of aid from 
Fascist Germany. 
The war started out as a series of almost disconnected 
offensives which rapidly developed into stalemates. Franco 
held the North,excluding Asturias, and most of the coast 
around Gibraltar and Seville. The government held the great 
central plain of Castile, Catalonia, and most of the southern 
coast. 
----~~=~ 
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In August the Insurgents took Irun and San Sebastian and 
gradually crept in four columns toward Madrid. On the way, at 
Toledo, they raised the siege of the Alcazar where 1700 rebels 
had been trapped since the first day of the war. In answer to 
the governmen~s efforts to starve out the defenders of the 
Alcazar, Franco, on finally relieving it, loosed his Moors in 
the Loyalist hospital in Toledo, where they slaughtered 600 
wounded men with hand grenades. 1 
In November Franco readied Madrid and it appeared that 
the Republic was about to draw its dying gasp. 
mendously superior air force destroyed one-third of the city 
by bombing. Five major infantry offensives were launched in 
an effort to pierce into the city proper. Everything failed. 
Nothing could smash Madrid's valiant defense. Nothing could 
shatter her great morale. 
At this point in history, the story of the war is inex-
tricably involved with one major fact -- intervention. By 
August, the Deutschland had appeared off Ceuta, and shortly II 
afterwards German destroyers and submarines filled the Spanish I, 
1. John Gunther, Inside Europe, p. 222. 
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waters. German and Italian planes, manned by their original 
pilots,were taking active parts in land warfare. German and 
Italian tanks, munitions, guns, and materiel of all kinds came II 
flooding to Franco through Portugal, which made little pre-
tense at actual neutrality. 
The factors underlying this aid are fairly simple to 
analyze. Franco needed help, munitions and "volunteer troops,'' 
because not enough Spaniards were behind him to guarantee even 11 
a chance of his success. He would have folded in the middle 
had it not been for outside intervention. Both Hitler and 
Mussolini proffered aid because they saw Spain as a perfect 
political and strategic buffer for them. They realized the 
value to them of a France weakened by another Fascist state 
at her border, the value of a sphere of influence in North 
Africa and the Western Mediterranean. They both sent covetous I 
glances towards Spanish ore and mineral deposits. The Axis.: 
gave recognition, both de Jure and de facto, to Franco Spain 
II 
I, in No~ember of 1936. 
By April of 1937 Germany had hundreds of planes and 
:i 
10.,000 ·"technicians," the famous Condor Legion, in Spain, and :1 
the Italians had as many planes and over 100,000 troops. Inter-
vention, however, bred counter-intervention, although on an 
,, extremely smaller scale. Motivated by a common hate of 
Fascist aggression, volunteers from all over the world --
liberals, anti-Fascists, sociall.sts, communists -- poured into I 
Loyalist Spain and formed the International Brigade, the first ~~ 
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army of this kind in modern history. It included Poles, Bel- 'I 
glans, Russians, Czechs, English, Canadians, 2700 Americans, 
I 
French, and anti-Fascist Germans and Italians. At its peak it 
numbered perhaps 20,000 men. But this relatively small force ' 
was of inestimable value to the government from the points of 
view of both morale and military service. In the November, 
1936, defense of the Capital, it alone plugged the breach 
which Franco threatened to pour through. In October, the So- · 
viet Union began sending tanks, airplanes, and f;ood. No 
Russian troops were sent to Spain, but . the Red planes were of 
so great help that by early spring Loyalist pilots flying 
Russian pursuit ships had virtual command of the skies above 
Spain. I 
The war dragged on interminably, both sides exchanging ·1 
I 
important victories. The rebels took Malaga in February, 1937,1 
and Bilbao in June. They could not, however, ~mash Madrid, 
and could get nowhere near either Barcelona or Valencia. The 
Loyalists won a great victory in March, 1937, at Guadalajara, 
where an entire Italian army was virtually decimated, the 
Italians -.losing more men in this Brihuega defeat than they 
2 had in the entire Ethiopian War. 
During the campaigns, excesses on both sides horrified 
the entire world, but in the Basque campaign, Franco gave it 
I 
a new shudder, when his German aviators methodically pulverized 
2. Gunther, QR. cit., p. 224. 
----==~=== 
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Franco opened an aerial bombardment of Barcelona that was so 
I! 
1 vicious in its disregard for military objectives that even the 1 
Pope in Rome inveighed against him and asked him to cease 
3. E. Allison Peers, Spain in Eclipse, p. 38. 
I 
·=Jr 
causing the unnecessary loss of life and limb among non-
combatants. After the air offensive, Franco launched a great 
1 
land drive which took Tarragona on January 14. Barcelona fell :: 
12 days later, the government withdrawing first to Figueras, 
and then to the French border near Hendaye . Madrid, however, 
stil l wa s holding gallantly. A coup d'etat by General Casado . 
within Madrid, however, ousted the government, Negrin and Al-
varez· del Vayo fled to France, and Madrid sued for peace in 
March. On the 28th, the rebels were no longer rebels, and 
marched victoriously into Madrid. Franco, the man who had 
broken two holy oaths; first to the king when he took service 
1\ 
I 
under the Republic, and second to the Republic when he started !1 
the rebellion, undertook supreme authority with, as he ironi -
cally phrased it, "responsibility only to God and h1story. 114 
4. Gunther, 22· cit., p. 226. 
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CHAPTER III 
BIAS ANALYSIS 
-- ------=----=--=~---
I 
This analysis will attempt to show something that is gen-
erally known to be true-- namely, that bias existed (and for 
that matter exists) on certain papers throughout Massachusetts 
for certain reasons. So, from the point of view of presenting 
anything astoundingly new to the field of newspaper analysis, 
this study is of relatively little worth. It is, however, 
1 not lacking in value of a different sort. It is evidence, it 
, is documentation, it is proof, that papers with predominant 
Catholic readerships gave their readers a biased, distorted 
view of a certain segment in history because of pressures, con-
scious or otherwise, exerted by the fact that the Church had a 
stake in that segment ot history. It will present no burning 
message, but rather will exist for its own sake as a case his-
tory in distortion. It will make no recommendations, call 
forth no crusade to end bias. It will, I hope, however, serve 
1 as a reference to those students interested in the Spanish 
1 Civil War in general, and the many ways papers manipulated the 
truth in particular. If, perchance, it can be used some day 
as documentation in some unforeseen struggle to eliminate con-
scious bias in newspapers, the personal reward involved will 
have been tremendously multiplied. Even as it stands, though, 
I' if but one person is further enlightened in learning to what 
depths of distortion newspapers can sink, the labor involved 
1 will have been well worth it. 
28 
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The papers used in this study are primarily the Boston 
American 1 the Boston Post 1 and the Berkshire Evening Eagle. 
Passing references will be made to the ~nn Item, the Haver-
hill Gazette 1 the Lowell Leader 1 the Taunton Gazette, and the 
Worcester Gazette. The American 1 studies have shown, has a lo~-
income, working-class, predominantly Catholic readership. The 11 
I 
Post 1 it is rumored, has almost the same relation to the Arch- ' 
diocese of Boston as Izvestia has to the Kremlin. The Item, 
Leader, and the various Gazettes were chosen because they rep- 11 
resent cities, for the most part industrial, with large con-
centrations of low-income workers. In Massachusetts these 
workers are overwhelmingly Catholic. The Berkshire Eagle was 
chosen as representative of that area of the state (western) 
where the Catholic population is relatively .small and where 
so-called "Yankee" influences predominate. This paper was not 
chosen to illustrate any anti-Catholic stand, but rather to 
typify those papers free from undue outside influence either 
from church authorities or because they wanted to present a 
view their readers 11 wanted to read." 
The methodology to be employed is as simple as possible. 
The passage or part containing biased or untruthful reporting ' 
will be cited and history and hindsight will be brought to 
bear to show what the bias was or what the real truth was. 
The extracts will follow the course of the war in chronologi-
cal order, with deviations only to elaborate a point or bring 
something newly relevant to the matter being discussed. 
29 
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II 
On July 18, 1936, Franco started his rebellion. Massa-
chusetts papers played it rather for three days until the 
picture was fairly well established. Then the fur began to 
fly. On the 21st an editorial pointed to Spain and warned of 
the dangers resulting from the Communists• (a revolutionary 
1 
minority party) (sic) achieving a balance of power. Nothing 
could have been further from the truth. At the time of the 
rebellion and for some time afterwards not one Communist was 
in the cabinet or in a position of responsibility. 2 This 
slight piece of deception set the stage for the American. 
From then on the Republic was Red. 
The very next day, Hearst's ace foreign man, H. R. 
Knickerbocker, stated flatly in a by-lined feature column that 
3 Spain's common people were on the side of the Insurgents. 
Obviously, if this were so, Franco would not have needed the 
Moore, Foreign Legion, German and Italian troops he used to 
win his war. The Insurgents had little or no 11 common 11 follow-
ing except in isolated Navarre. 
1. Boston American, Boston, Mass., July 21, 1936, p. 36. 
2. Frank Jellinek, The Civil War in Spain, p. 304. 
3. American, loc. cit., July 22, 1936, p. a. 
~-== -~ = =- -=--== -== ------ = ===--=c 
~-:==~==================== 
A more accurate picture of the Spanish situation at the 
time was given by the perspicacious newspaper, the Berkshire 
Evening Eagle, when it said in an editorial on the 21st, "the " 
war ..• a struggle of outs versus ins. The military caste 
has much to grieve over since the Republic sent them into re-
tirement. • It seems they are inclined to believe in the 
4 
efficiency of the bullet over the ballot." The Eagle also 
labeled the Insurgents Rightists and Fascists, which they were .l 
The American stuck to Insurgents until a better euphemism 
came along. It was the 11 White 11 army which it always used in 
opposition to the 11 Red 11 . army. This 11 Whi ten label was easily 11 
I 
the most ironic twist of the war. Rather than Reds, the Eagle's 
heads and dispatches went only as far as to call Loyalists I 
Leftists. Even this was not wholly true, but it was generally 
true. The government was Left but not Communist, an important 
difference, but a difference the American evidently could not 
see. The American finished off the month by a head, "Red 
Committee Ready to Seize Reins in Madrid. 115 The article fol-
lowing gave no agency credit. Authorities totally fail to 
substantiate this. 11 
August was the month for atrocity stories, and the com- :1 
pletely misleading attitudes that the Massachusetts papers I 
presented on the role the church was playing in Spain. There 
4. Berkshire Evening Eagle,Pittsfield, Mass., July 21, 1936, 
p. 10. 
5. AI!leri_can, l.oc. ci t 9 J_E~ 27, 1~~6 ~p_.. 2.'=====~ ______ _ 
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1 
is no doubt that violent excesses were perpetrated by extrem-
ists on the government side against the church. The papers 
reported these atrocities faithfully, sparing not one gory de-
6 
tail. "Spanish Mobs Shoot Pries-ts 1 Burn Churches, 11 "Reds 
7 Burn Priests at Stake" were common heads and stories. Haver-
hill, Taunton, and Lynn papers also gave these stories tre-
mendous play. On August 2, the American ran a story under the I 
by-line of a Fr. Joseph Ahern showing how Spain was a Communist j 
a plot to destroy all the world 1 s religions. The Post during 
the month ran the following editorial: 
"Fantastic claims of government in church seizures 
found $2 million in one church and $1 million in !I 
another -- Spanish churches are desperately poor -- , 
accumulation of such amounts of money impossible -- Gov- I· 
ernment claim that they found rebel volunteers dressed 
in clerical robes -- a most unbelievable thing -- no 
doubt though that the church would be hostile to a gov-
ernment that decrees its dissolution, allows the burning 
of churches, and sanctions attacks on priests and nuns.n9 
Evidently these papers felt that their readers would gain 
little from the truth in these matters. It must be remembered 11 
that these excesses occurred after Franco 1 s rebellion. In 
part they were precipitated after a stupid boast by General 
Mola that a fifth column would rise in Madrid. Naturally, 
6. American, loc. cit. 1 Aug. 2, 1936, p. 1. 
7. American, Aug. 27, 1936, p. 1. 
a. American, Aug. 2, 1936, p. 11 
9. Boston Post, Boston, Mass., Aug. 3, 1936, p. la. 
~-----
- --
••• ~J ~· .=.:..::.•1 --~-· -, --~ - , .-- - -
12. Post, loc. cit., August 24, 1936, p. 6. 
13. American, September 6, 1936, p. 1. 
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rebel sympathizers were hunted out and shot. The atrocities 
were conducted by the Anarchists. Every responsible person II 
in the government deplored them and they were soon eradicated. 1 
Too, the Post's editorial seems rather weak in the light or 
what the historical section of this work10 has shown about 
the church and the Family. The church had bled the people 
II 
unmercifully, had a large percentage of Spain's total capital, 
and was hand-in-glove with Franco's Fascists. Even this is 
no excuse for the excesses against the church, but it does 
form a set of extenuating circumstances -that readers should 
have been informed about but were not. 
On in August and into September the ' Red atrocity stories 
1 
continued. "Reds Crucify Priests, nll "Archbishop of Tanagona 
. 12 
Assassinated by Government Agents," "Children Slain by Cruci-
14 I 
fixion, n13 11 600 Priests Murdered in Toledo." The Post, in an 
editorial in August, said of the government's statement of 
what would happen if the Insurgents took Madrid, 11 It is a new 
record for brutality and destruction. 1115 Was it really? 
We must remember at this time that the American and ~ost 
and the smaller pro-Franco papers were carrying no news what-
soever of the atrocities on the other side. It is necessary 
10. cr~ pp. 1-20 passim. 
11. Post, loc. cit., Sept. 4, 1936, p. 1. 
12. ~~ loc. cit., August 24, 1936, p. 6. 
13. American, September 6, 1936, p. 1. 
14. American, September 29, 1936, p. 2. 
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to turn to the Berkshire Eagle to learn of the methodical 
slaughter of Spanish peasantry and workers by Franco's troops. 
On August 14, a page one box told of 1000 government militia-
men, including 100 women, dying in mass execution at Almendara- J 
lejo.16 On August 8th another front-page box quoted the rebel I 
general Capollano: 
"I have been compelled by force of circumstance 
to execute a large number of people. In Andalusia 
alone, I executed no less than 20 well-known persons 
belonging to high ranks in the Army, civil affairs, 
and politics. 11 17 
The general attitude of the Eagle towards the rebels was 
ind.icated:. in an August 7th editorial: II I 
"Rebel armies have 
ing·ra tee taking up arms 
and elected government. 
national standing. nl8 
only the status of political 
against a duly constituted 
As such they have no inter-
The Eagle published faithfully and objectively atrocity 
I 
news from both sides. In this respect it far surpassed any of \ 
the other papers involved in this study which published no news 
! 
I 
i deprecatory ·. to the side they were 
rage about 11Red atrocities," they 
backing. While screaming in 
saw fit to overlook the fact \ 
that at Badajoz in September 4000 
. . I 
loyal civilians were machine-
. 19 gunned in the bull-ring, and that Moors killed 600 wounded 
Another fact not printed by the American ~ al was that 
the Fascists also had no compunction whatsoever when it came 
to killing priests. Basque priests in particular, loyal to 
the government, w.ere murdered by Franco• s men when Bilbao was 
taken, and loyal priests were given protection and comfort by 
the government. 21 This seems to give the lie to the "Com-
munist anti-religion plot 11 theory. 
The American went on recklessly. In a September story 
on page 2 it told of the Communists in the new cabinet; 22 
Caballero, Prieto, Uribe, and Ferandez. Largo Caballero was 
a Socialist, Indalecio Prieto a right-wing Socialist, Amador 
34 
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20 
after capturing a government hospital at Toledo. 
Another fact not printed by the American ~ al was that 
the Fascists also had no compunction whatsoever when it came 
to killing priests. Basque priests in particular, loyal to 
the government,were murdered by Franco's men when Bilbao was 
taken, and loyal priests were given protection and comfort by 
the government. 21 This seems to give the lie to the "Com-
munist anti-religion plot 11 theory. 
The American went on recklessly. In a September story 
on page 2 it told of the Communists in the new oabinet: 22 
Caballero, Prieto, Uribe, and Ferandez. Largo Caballe~o was 
a Socialist, Indalecio Prieto a right-wing Socialist, Amador 
Ferandez also a Socialist, and of the four only Uribe, Minis-
ter of Agriculture, a Communist. This was pure perversion of 
the truth. 
Another interesting item in the American after their 
clamor about atrocities was a piece by Lee Dickson, INS cor-
resp9ndent who was an eye-witness when Mala's legionnaires 
shot 50 bound militiamen at Behobia. "In a battle such as 
this there is no time to take prisoners," Dickson blithely 
23 
reported. 
20. Gunther, 
21. Jellinek, 
22. American, 
23. American, 
p. 222, and Whitaker, 
.212.· cit., pp • 113-114. 
.212.· cit. , p. 421. 
Sept. 4, 1936, p. 2. 
Sept. 3, 1936, p. 
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On October 3rd, in an editorial in the American it was 1 
On November 2?th their first lead read, 
I 
"200 Soviet Warplanes Landed for Spain Reds." Then in the col-
umn they gave credit to the 
24 . American, Oct. 3, 1936, 
25. Cf. pp. 15-20 :a.assim. 
26. American, Oct. 23, 1936, 
2?. American, Nov. 13, 1936, 
28. American, Nov. 2?, 1936, 
souro e, "Italian s ouroes said. • 28 ·II 
p. 
p. 
p. 
p. 
1. 
1. 
36. 
2. 
I 
II 
=---==-- :=:=.==---=- -=---~ 
---========---- --
An American editorial on December 28 brought a contro-
versial figure into discussion. The head led off with "A 
Famous Spaniard Indicts Reds." "Miguel de Unamuno, rector of 
the University of Salamanca, in a letter to Nicholas Murray 
Butler, president of Columbia University, brands the war as 
an ''Eastern fantastic scheme which would certainly destroy 
everything.• Senor Unamuno is a brave man, all the more so 
as he is not a reactionary (sic) but one of the most liberal 
"29 
minded men in Spain, a real democratic individualist." 
Miguel de Unamuno, "the Basque of Basques," ·was a colorful 
figure of this period, often vacillating back and forth from 
one side to the other. At the time of this letter, Salamanca 
was in the hands of the Insurgents. With this in mind and in 
all fairness, I believe it is possible to dismiss both Sr. 
Unamuno 1 s letter and the American's logic, as the result of 
one of the good Senor's vacillations. 
At the close of the section dealing with the period of 
1936, it might well be advantageous to discuss the problem of 
labels. The Eagle from the very first, and then continually, 
called the government both "liberal, 11 11 Loyal 11 and "leftist. 11 
The rebels were "Fascists" or "rightists." The American named 
the gov~rnment "Red" from the start, while the rebels were 
"Insurgents" or the "White Army," never Fascists or rightists. 
29. American, Dec. 28, 1936, p. 38. 
3? 
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The Post, which had a "curse on both your houses" attitude 
for the first three or four weeks, changed from "leftists" to 
"Reds" in August. Franco's forces were never Fascists in this 
paper either. 
Taunton, Worcester, Lynn, Lowell, and Haverhill papers 
generally followed the line of the Post, both editorially and 
oontentw1se. The government forces became "Reds" in August or li 
September, and through the entire course of the war, references 
to the rebels as Rightists or Fascists were indeed few. 
38 
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The American started off 1937 in its usual style, playing 
all "Red atrocity" stories and completely disregarding Rebel 
excesses. Just before Bilbao was captured in February, they 
topped all previous efforts with one story. Perhaps the most 
interesting thing about it was its source. The story read, 
11 200 Insurgent hostages in Bilbao jails herded together and 
blown up with grenades -- the Bishop of Siguenza driven naked 
through the streets with a crown of thorns on his head --
jeered at by throngs of leering prostitutes -- this lasted 
three days -- then they killed him, chopped off his arms and 
1 legs, and hung him upside-down from a street pole." This 
story was delivered by no eye-witness nor, for that matter, by 
even an accredited correspondent, but by the Marquis del Moral, 
a paid Franco propagandist stationed in London. From this 
point on the INS relied heavily on this Marquis del Moral for 
the majority of its Spanish news, evidently not feeling it 
necessary to check on his reliability, a check that ·should 
have been made for the good Marquis' batting average was way 
off. He was right about two per cent of the time. 
On February 7, the American reached what is probably the 
height of hypocrisy in the history of u.s. journalism. It 
carried an article by-lined by El Caudillo himself, Francisco 
1~ American, Feb. 2, 1937, p. 1. 
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2 Franco Bahamonde, decrying Red atrocities. This by the man 1 
who engineered Badajoz and Toledo, the man who once declared 
in an interview with Jay Allen of the Chicago Tribune that 
he would not compromise even if it meant executing half of 
3 Spain. 
It was in March of this year that Madrid held again in 
the face of a highly publicized Franco "Easter offensive." 
For days Radio Seville and its chief commentator, General 
Don Gonzalo Quiepo de Llano, told Spain and the world that 
Franco would celebrate Easter mass in Madrid. Toward the end h 
of March, the Insurgent forces threw their great hosts at the 
walls of the capital time and time again, and then finally 
withdrew miserably beaten. After the ballyhoo the American 
had given the offensive, it was, in the vernacular, left 
holding the bag. Instead of announcing the failure, it pre-
sented a Von Weigand column minimizing government victories 
and presenting the new strategy considered by Franco. 4 
The Berkshire Eagle carried full accounts of the "Easter 
5 II 
offensive" failure written from both points of view. Another 
little item that the American"missed" that the Eagle carried 
was the fact that,during the ill-fated offensive, a serious 
2. American, Feb. 7, 193?, p. 6. 
3. Gunther, ~. cit., p. 22?. 
4. American, March 28, 193?, p. 8. 
5. Berkshire Eagle, March 30, 31, 193?, p. 1. 
40 
rebellion took place within Franco's forces. 6 Evidently, 
ruthlessly crushed, it got no further play in any of the 
Massachusetts papers. 
The Boston American and the Boston Post are generally 
recognized to be two papers that snap at chances to play 
I 
II 
II 
:I 
I 
II 
stories involvingheroic rescues of little children and other II 
human interest stories of this variety. For some reason, on ! 
May 2, both these papers mysteriously failed to pick up a 
story that tugged at the heartstrings of all who read it. 
The Eagle carried it on page 1. It concerned a British boat 
that had run t .he Franco blockade into beleaguered Bilbao ex-
pressly for the purpose of removing from the danger zone 
5000 small childre~ all under 12. As the ship was about to 
leave with its pitiful cargo, the ominous word came from 
Franco that he would not guarantee safe passage. 7 
Another story avoided by the pro-Franco papers but played! 
to the hilt by the Eagle was the savage bombardment or Guer-
nica that raised a storm of outraged criticism of Franco all 
1 II 
over the world. For three-and-a-half hours German planes ' 
pounded the town unmercifully. The Insurgents claimed after- I' 
i 
wards that the retreating Basques had fired the town them- !i 
selves, but this was vitiated by the reports of neutral corre~r 
6. Ibid. 
7. Berkshire Eagle, May 2, 1937, p. 1. 
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pondents who saw Guernica three hours after the bombing and 
who found among the ruins and the dead and dying or this co~ 
pletely non-military objective, unexploded incendiary bombs 
marked 11 Rheindorf Factory, 1936."8 
I 
On May 30 and June 1, Franco's allies, the Nazis, stepped 
vigorously into the news picture when loyal planes bombed the II 
German blockading battleship Admiral Scheer, causing slight 
damage. With their Teutonic senses of fair play outraged, 
the Germans sent the Deutschland to bombard Almeria, a town 
of no military value. The American excused the Germans with 
9 
"avenged the air attack" and let it go at that. Thousands 
of ·non-combatants were killed and Peers characterized it as 
11brutal and excessive.n10 
On September 5, the American came up with the figure 
that 6000 priests had been killed in Spain. :I Their comment was, 
11 They were killed for no other reason than their function in 
11 
society." This writer doubts the authenticity of the :fig-
ures, and of course the reader has by now been acquainted 
with the fact that if priests were executed, it was not be-
cause they were priests but also Fascists. 
8. Atholl, QQ. cit., pp. 154-155. 
9. American, June 1, 1937, p. l. 
10. Peers, Spain in Eclipse, p. 29. 
11. American, Sept. 5, 1937, p. 2. 
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Loaded heads cropped back into the American's bag of 
tricks when Spanish War news contained little that was bene-
ficial to the Rebels. A pag~ one head on September 13 read, 
12 11 League 0. K. 1 s Spain Reds. 11 Here the American, in a fine 
II 
II 
example of a distorted, loaded headline, saw an opportunity to 
take off on a favorite Hearst whipping boy, the League of Na- I 
tiona, as well as getting its licks in at the Spanish govern- I 
ment. The story under the head was not that the League en-
dorsed Communism or anarchy,or anything for that matter, but 
just that they had voted that the Loyalists were still the 
legally constituted government of Spain. 
Co~plete and total inaccuracy can only be the judgment 
attached to an American story run on November 2. The head 
read, "British and Franco in Secret Pact." . The rest of the 
story went on, 11 --- designed to protect British economic in- 'i 
terests in Insurgent Spain. --- Britain has agreed to accord 
the Franco regime£& facto recognition. British military ex- 1 
13 ' perts now believe that Franco is destined to win the war." i 
This was undoubtedly nothing less than wishful thinking. His-
tory shows that there was no such secret pact, and that 
Britain did not recognize Franco until 14 months later. 
On the 21st of this month the American switched back to 
the religious angle, carrying an unligatured front-page story, 11 
----------~! 
12. American, Sept. 13, 193?, p. 1. 
13. American, Nov. 2, 193?, p. 1. 
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"U.S. Bishops Hit Spain." 11 --- clever propaganda, mal·i-
ciously used, has beclouded the facts --- You have been 
maligned before the world as though unmindful of your great 
tradition (of Spanish Clergy) you had forgotten the sorry 
14 plight of your peasants and workers." "As if" here is 
ironic. The maligning had taken place because they had 
forgotten. 15 
I 
II 
II 
On December 2?, an unligatured story appeared in the 
American full of praise for the Insurgents in a certain sec- 11 
tor. "Defying flame and bullets, scores of Insurgents in 
beleaguered Teruel persisted today in their choice of death 
16 before surrender." Undoubtedly, the American considered 
the defenders of said Teruel brave, but what its readers did 
not know, and were not told, was that Teruel was one of the 
biggest government victories of the war. All the other papers, 
carried the Teruel victory story except the American. 
In 193?, a bad year for Franco, the American generally 
avoided the real news of the war and instead carried atrocity 1 
. II 
stories and little squibs of Am~pj.q~rJ, people and property in-
volved in Spain. The Post, for a metropolitan daily, showed 11 
a remarkable unconcern for Spanish War news in 193?, as did 
I 
the smaller out-of-town papers. The Berkshire Eagle, however, 11 
14. American, Nov. 21, 193?, p. 1. 
15. Cf. Alfredo Mendizabal, The Martyrdom of Spain, Part III. , 
16. American, December 2?, 1937, p. 2. 
-- - - ===--c=-=--o===========-c 
\I 
I 
prominently -played the war news almost daily, and was objec- II 
tive and fair almost to a fault both editorially and in news I' 
content. 
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In 1938 the American came up with a new propagandist, one ! 
"Marquise Nena Belmonte, daughter of one of Spain's noblest 
houses." Extensive research into Who's Who in Spain, Inter-
national Who's Who, and the Spanish Peerage, failed to dis-
At any rate, in her I 
first column she told of an interview with "Consuelo !le.rcia, I 
a young girl fox-ced to carry a gun against her will." Capture , 
close the existence of this young lady. 
by the Foreign Legion, she reported, "They gave me water --
treated me very kindly offered me my freedom to return to 
Madrid. I had learned to love these soldiers who had treated 
me so kindly, and I decided to stay with them permanently. 
1 Now I am a nurse at an Insurgent hospital." All this seems 
rather silly in the light of what Quiepo de Llano himself said 
about women Red prisoners, "One girl for each 20 Moors! 112 I 
Again on March 10, Miss Belmonte's by-line appeared over 
a column in which she glowingly described the men in Franco's 
cabinet and said, "Franco's government is a guarantee of sta-
bili ty in Spain. ,n 3 
A few days later a 50-inch photo adorned the pages of the 
American, a picture of Franco infantry charging over a wall. 
1. American, March 8, 1938, p. 4. 
2. Gunther, p. 224; Whitaker, p. 114. 
3. American, March 10, 1938, p. 6. 
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The caption read, 11 Death awaits those who will meet the 
II thrus~ 
of these bayonets. 114 This compared to another picture they 
had run previously, a photo of boys waving guns in Madrid, 
captioned "Communist agents from Moscow told these boys to 
. 5 
fight-- then hid themselves, 11 leaves little doubt as to the 
political persuasion of the Boston American. 
Her Highness the Marquise also appeared on Marchl6 on 
the very next page, by-lining an article so full of obvious 
propaganda that it doesn't even bear reproduction here. The 
gist of the article portrayed Franco's men tenderly caring 
for enemy wounded and bringing up food for enemy towns just 
I 
5 II captured. This hardly corresponds to the London Times re-
port that 1n "Every village the three or four leading Republ1~ 
cans are shot. In Cordova 2000 people were executed, and 180~ 
in Saragossa. In Seville 9000 people were shot, 6000 in 
Granada, in Pamplova 3000."6 
On March 17, one of the most wanton acts in the history 
of the war took place. The rebel air force bombed the city 
of Barcelona with almost the saturdation effectiveness that 
they had had on Guernica. The Berkshire Eagle reported that 
1200 civilians were killed and 2000 were badly wounded and 
4. American, March 16, 1938, p. 4. 
5. Ibid., p. 5. 
6. Gunther, p. 229. 
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The American and the Lynn Item reported the bombings, 
but somehow found it expeditious to stress the fact that 
8 German and Italian planes had done the bombing. The Eagle 
meanwhile had stuck to the "Rebel air force." The Post, by 
some 11 slip~1 announced that Franco bombers had killed 14 people 
9 in the Barcelona raid. 
These horrifying raids on a civilian populace aroused 
public opinion all over the world and both lay and Protestant 
clerical groups in this country raised their voices in bitter ! 
storms of protest. On March 21, after 61 Protestant bishops 
had appealed to Catholic clergy in this country to use their 
influence and weight with Franco to stop the hideous bomqing 
of civilians, the American carried a front-page story con-
cerning the editor of the Atlantic Monthly, Ellery Sedgwick, 
who proclaimed 11 that he was grossly misrepresented in the 
appeal made by the bishops. 11 (Evidently they had quoted him.) 
Sedgwick went on to say that 11 the Reds were much worse than 
the Whites, but now that they have lost control of the air, 
they are trying to invoke public opinion against air attacks." 
In the same article, a Boston priest, J. P. Flanagan, 
was quoted as saying, 11 In Spain - -- the struggle is between 
Communism on one side and Catholicism as represented by 
Franco. Don 1t be fooled by 90.% of the American press." 
7. Berkshire Eaije, March 17, 1938, p. 1. 
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8. Lynn Daily Evening Item,Lynn,Mass.; American,March 17,.1938,p.l. 
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Other priests in the same article said, 11Why didn't these 
people who want to stop bombings speak out against atrocities 11 
10 I 
on nuns?" The implication here, of course, other than the I 
obvious slur against the 61 bishops and the oft-repeated 
1 
false dogma · about Communism and Catholicism, is that "you had \I 
your chance and now that your side is catching it, it's just 
too bad." For the next three days, the American carried 
stories by other priests saying,in effect: (1) We don't be-
lieve that the Insurgents have done these bombings; and (2) 
How come the protesters have been silent on Red atrocities? 
If any answer to this question is necessary, let it be said 
here that groups in this country were continually calling for ' 
a cessation of atrocities on both sides. Readers of the 
American and the Post, of course, were not aware of any atroci-
l! 
ties other than "Red atrocities" and so could exclaim over 
the lack of concern for the Insurgents whom everyone else 
knew to be also butchers of a high order. The Barcelona 
II 
II 
bombings, however, capped a bloody page in the history of un- I 
necessary slaughter of innocent civilians and it was no won-
der that public opinion became more audible than it had been 
in the past. 
Some sort of ironic poetic justice gave a tremendous 
loss of face to both those who refused to believe in the bomcJ 
ings themselves, and to those who refused to temper revenge 
10. American, l~rch 21, 1938, p. 1. 
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with mercy, when the Pope appealed to Franco to stop the 
11 
"slaughter of non-combatants." The American carried the 
story with no comment and immediately ceased the "tough luck, 
but -- 11 stories that they had carried for the three previous i 
days. The Post, which had also gone overboard on this type 
of story, refused to eat crow and did not publish the Pope's 
message. They did, however, stop the stories. 
The Post, on March 24, had an interesting editorial ob-
jecting to a Department of Internal Revenue ruling that gifts 
to organizations giving medical aid to the Loyalists were 
12 
tax-free. Using the tack of the previously mentioned gen-
tlemen, it seems strange that they never objected to similar 
tax-free deductions for Insurgent medical aid programs. 
A Post feature story on March 2? came up with the followi 
ing interesting opinions: "The extremist massacres of men 
and women and children are far worse than the InsuDgents' 
military killings {sic)." The article also pointed out that 
the revolt was justified and pointed to the American revolu-
tion as a precedent for Spain in that a minority was rising 
against an oppressive majority.13 What the Post failed to 
point out is that the Spanish government was duly elected by 
11. Berkshire Eagle, March 23, 1938, p. 1. 
12. Post, March 24, 1938, p. 1. 
13. Post, March 2?, 1938, p. 1. 
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the Spanish people, and that the government of the 13 colonies 
I, 
was a foreign government in which the American people had no 
representation. One is given cause to wonder if the Post 
would hew to this philosophy today, for if it were followed 
logically, it would give the Communists the moral right to 
attempt to overthrow the government of the United States. 
The article finished by dragging Guernica out of the rubble 
again, and insisting it was not Franco but retreating govern-
1 
ment troops who destroyed it. The parting shot of the piece 
was in praise of Franco as a great administrator. 
All through the month of April, the American carried a 
series of features authored by one 11 0aptain 11 Alvin Halpern, 
who purportedly served with the Loyalists in Spain. It con-
tained the usual collection; horrible Communist plots, inter-
nal strife, shooting prisoners, treachery, etc. The articles 
tl 
ran for the .entire month. Each one was over 100 column inches 
in length. 
In the American on April 1?, C. J. O'Malley, "Boston 
business leader and world traveler," said "Franco has brought 
peace and hopefulness to Spain. The people are 100% behind 
14 the Insurgents where they have taken over." What Mr. 
I 
O'Malley did not observe or did not say was that if they were 
not 100% behind the Insurgents, they would probably be 100% 11 
dead. 
14. American, April 1?, 1938, p. 12. 
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The stalemate on the Ebro took Spain fairly well out of 
the news until January of the next year, when the Insurgents 
started the Barcelona offensive, but the Berkshire Eagle in-
jected a refreshing bit of truth and objectivity into the 
clouded scene as the war left the front pages. Their edito-
rial read, "It is only a question of time until the Fascist 
II 
~, 
I 
I 
I 
rebels crush the Loyalists into defeat --- the end is in ! 
I 
151 sight, and with it will come the end of democracy in Spain." 
In 1939, the Rebels had overwhelming land, air and naval 
strength, and began their push to end the war. Crushing out 
of the stalemated line at the Ebro, they shoved north up the 
coast and cut a huge wedge between Madrid and Barcelona. By 
the middle of January they were poundi ng on the gates of 
Barcelona, and took it on the 26th. 
The American and the Post played it to the hilt. The 
American 1 s head was "Franco Army in Barcelona, Feeds Hungry. 11 ' 
The rest of the story ran, "The people of Barcelona flocked 
from their houses to greet soldiers whose planes had been 
16 
raining death in their midsts for months." The very phras-
ing of this gives rise to a lot of speculation. It just does 
15. Berkshire Eagle, April 5, 1938, p. 10. 
16. American, January 26, 1939, p. 1. 
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not seem to ring true. The dispatch, of course, had to come 
from a correspondent with the Rebels. Barcelona had always 
been the center of leftist activity and had held out doggedly 1 
all through the war. One wonders just how much of the total 1! 
population of the city were celebrating in the streets, lit-
tering them with government money and No Pasaran signs, and 
screaming Franco, Franco, as the report said. One hardly 
1
1 . 
noticeable item sandwiched way back on page 11 gave ominous 
indication of the true extent of the celebration. The arti-
cle read, "Franco lists 1,000,000 foes to f'ace trial. 1117 
The parting distortions of the war f'or the American came !I 
in February. 11Bri tain, France, prepared to • ~hail~: (quotes 
mine) Franco rule," read a head on the 7th. 
18 
substantiated the word 11hail 11 in the head. 
The story hardly i 
A similar dis- II 
tortion appeared on the 27th when over a story of British 
and French recognition (de facto} of Franco appeared the 
head, 11 Vi va Franco. nl9 
After Casado 1 s coup d 1·etat, the American suddenly came 
to the realization after three long years, by references to 
Casado and Miaja and their backgrounds and party affiliationsj 
I 
that the government had contained elements other than 11 Red. 11 
The admission, however, did not phase the American. They 
blithely continued as though they had been right all along, 
17. Ibid, p. 11. 
18. American, February 7, 1939, p. 1 
19. American, February 27, 1939, p. 1. 
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anyway. 
On March 28, Madrid fell, and the score on editorials 
was to be expected -- six eulogies of Franco, although in ~11 I 
fairness it must be stated that some warned of the inherent I 
I danger from another Fascist state, and one lone voice, the 
Eagle, mourned the death of freedom and democracy 1n Spain. 
I 
I 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
r 
I 
,, 
II 
t II 
i) 
The conclusions of ~his study are obvious. There can be :1 
little doubt that the papers in Massachusetts with predominantLI! 
ly Catholic readerships, _ led by the American, followed by the 
Post , and in lesser degrees the smaller papers, distorted, 
slant ed, lied and misled to a degree that is almost unbeliev-
able. For an historian this fact is interesting. For a 
journalist, it is difficult to face. There can be no 
reason for this history of bias other than the fact that 
these papers sacrifi ced objectivity for the sake of giving 
t heir readers what they wanted to read or what a certain 
group wanted them to read. There can be no excuse for this 
in a free press that must act as a disseminating agency of 
news for all the people regardless of persuasion, creed, or 
belief if it is to fulfill its function in society. Differ-
ences of opinion, yes -- but making the facts conform to the 
opinions -- never! 
There is patently a great deal wrong with the state of 
journalism when a situation like this is allowed to exist. 
This writer refuses to believe that nothing can be done about 
it. The answer lies in the sources of education and enlight-
enment that train the people who eventually will be forming 
top-level policy in the world of journalism. This thesis 
now adds its voice to the many other voices in the profession 
crying out for the ascendance of the scholar and the downfall 
of the opinionated hack, a great birth of a universal jour-
il 
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nalistic ethic, and the pursuit of interpretive objectivity. 
The schools and colleges have the seed. The tree can exist 
for us it we nurture it carefully. 
-=--- ~ -= --==--- =--=====--= --- ====== 
I 
I 
57 
li 
II 
II 
[ 
II 
I 
I 
It 
I 
58 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
The Forging of a Rebel, Arturo Barea, New York, 1936. 
The Masquerade in Spain, Charles Foltz, Jr., Boston, 1948. 
Spain's Ordeal, Robert Sencourt (pseudonym), London, 1938. j I . 
The Martyrdom of Spain, Alfredo Mendizabal, 
Searchlight on Slain, Katherine, Duchell of 
· worth Eng.), 1938. 
New York, 1938. 
1 
Atholl, Hammonds- 1 
I 
We Cannot Escape History, John T. Whitaker, New York, 1943. 
The Spanish Tragedy, E. Allison Peers, London, 1937. 
Spain in Eclipse, E. Allison Peers, London, 1943. 
Report from Spain, Emmet Hughes, New York, 1947. 
Freedom's Battle, Julio Alvarez del Vayo, London, 1940. 
The Spanish Cockpit, Frank Borkenau, London, 1937. 
The Spanish Labyrinth, Gerald Brenan, New York, 1943. 
The Civil War in Spain, Frank Jellinek, London, 1938. 
I 
I 
II 
II 
The Spanish Arena, William Foss and Cecil Gerahty, 
Inside Europe, John .Gunther, New York, 1940. 
London,l931l· 
The Spanish Tragedy, Jef Last, London, 1939. 
All the Brave, Luis Quintanilla, Elliot Paul, Jay Alleh, 
Ernest Hemingway, New York, 1939. 
Newspapers 
The Boston American, Boston, Mass., 1936-1939. 
The Boston Post, Boston, Mass., 1936-1939. 
The Berkshire Evening Eagle, Pittsfield, Mass., 1936-1939. 
The Haverhill Gazette, Haverhill, Mass., 1936-1939. 
II 
I 
I 
59 
--=------· 
The Lowell Leader, Lowell, Mass., 1936-1939. 
The Lynn Daily Evening Item, Lynn, Mass., 1936-1939. 
The Taunton Gazette, Taunton, Mass., 1936-1939. 
The Worcester Gazette, Worcester, Mass., 1936-1939. 
The New York Times, New York, N. Y., 1936-1939. 
60 
